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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This appeal is from the summary judgment entered July 
20, 1987 adjudging that appellants' compl aint for damages 
arising from respondent's alleged refusal po make a 30-year 
loan was barred by ' the Statute of Frauds], Utah Code Ann, 
§ 25-5-4(1) (1984). The Utah Supreme Coilrt had appellate 
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant tq> Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(3)(i) (1987); this Court has 
adjudicate the appeal pursuant to Utah Cdde Ann. §§ 78-2-
2(4) and 78-2a-3(2)(h) (1987). 
jurisdiction to 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the District Court err in ruling that an 
alleged oral agreement to loan money for 30 years is subject 
to the Statute of Frauds and that the possibility of 
respondent's performance within a year did not take that 
alleged agreement from the Statute of Frauds? 
2. Did the District Court err in rejecting appellants1 
untimely and inadequate attempted invocation of Rule 56(f) , 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, especially when there were no 
disputed issues of material fact? 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
This appeal involves the interpretation and application 
of the following: 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4 (1984): 
Certain agreements void unless written and 
subscribed. In the following cases, every 
agreement shall be void unless such agreement, 
or some note or memorandum thereof
 r is in 
writing subscribed by the party to be charged 
therewith: 
(1) Every agreement that by its terms is 
not to be performed within one year from 
the making thereof. . . . 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; 
defense required. Supporting and opposing 
affidavits shall be made on personal 
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would 
be admissible in evidence, and shall show 
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to 
testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn 
or certified copies of all papers or parts 
thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be 
-2-
attached thereto or served ther 
court may permit affidavits to be 
or opposed by depositions, 
interrogatories, or further affidcl 
a motion for summary judgment : 
supported as provided in this rule 
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hst him. 
ac 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should 
it appear from the affidavits 
opposing the motion that he cannot 
stated present by affidavit facts essential to 
justify his opposition, the court 
the application for judgment or may order a 
continuance to permit affidavi 
obtained or depositions to be 
discovery to be had or may make 
order as is just. 
lof a party 
for reasons 
may refuse 
ts to be 
taken or 
such other 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action was instituted by appellants on May 15, 
1987, to recover damages and punitive damages they allegedly 
incurred by reason of respondent's alleged! refusal to make 
appellants a thirty-year loan. R.2-7. On June 4, 1987, 
respondent moved to dismiss, R.11-12, 
appellants' alleged oral contract was void under the Statute 
On June of Frauds, Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4(1). R|( 
24, 1987, appellants amended their Complaint, at 11 4, to 
aver that the alleged oral contract to loan money for 30 
years was evidenced by memoranda and documents executed by 
respondent. R.2-3, 25-26. 
asserting that 
.13-20 
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Appellants also submitted an Affidavit of Bryan w. 
Cannon, R.32-40, wherein Bryan W. Cannon stated, at II 10: 
"Affiant believes that additional written documents 
evidencing the application for approval of, and a loan to be 
made by Commonwealth to Affiant and spouse exist in nine 
percent (9%) one (1) [sic] in the file and records of 
Defendant." R.34. 
Respondent then filed an opposing Affidavit of Robert 
Bradley Meadows, R.44-46, wherein affiant stated, at K 7: 
"Contrary to Bryan Cannon's belief expressed in 1[ 10 of his 
Affidavit, no documents authored or subscribed by defendant, 
its agents or employees exist, or have ever existed, in the 
files and records of defendant referring or relating in any 
way to defendant's alleged offer to loan money to 
plaintiffs; this is so because defendant never approved a 
loan to plaintiffs and never authorized or approved a loan 
commitment to plaintiffs," R.45. This affidavit was filed 
simultaneously with respondent's Memorandum in reply to 
plaintiffs' Affidavit in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss* R.48-58. (A copy of respondent's Memorandum is 
included as Exhibit "A" to the Addendum, and is incorporated 
herein by such reference.) On appeal, appellants do not 
raise any of the issues addressed in Exhibit "A"; instead, 
they raise on appeal two arguments they presented at the 
hearing on respondent's motion. 
-.4-
The hearing on respondent's Motion 
properly and timely noticed for July 10, 
to Dismiss was 
11987. R.21. At 
ent's Motion to 
1987, Judge Bryan 
that hearing, appellants argued that (1| the Statute of 
Frauds did not apply to this action because! the alleged oral 
contract to make a thirty-year loan to appellants could be 
performed fully by respondent within one year; and (2) the 
district court should defer a decision' concerning the 
existence of writing sufficient to t^ke the alleged 
agreement out of the Statute of Frauds [until appellants 
conducted discovery. R.73-74. 
The district court granted respond 
Dismiss at that hearing, R.61; on July 20, 
signed a summary judgment dismissing appellants' claim on 
the merits. R.59-60. On August 3, 1987, respondent served 
its Notice of Entry of Judgment on appellants' counsel, 
R.62-63; appellants filed their Notice of 
18, 1987. R.66. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Appellants applied for a loan [from respondent* 
R.2, 25. 
2. The loan alleged by appellants vjzas to be repaid 
over 30 years. R.4, 27. 
3. Had appellants made loan applications to other 
lenders in Salt Lake County, Utah, they could have "locked 
Appeal on August 
-5-
in" terms comparable to those they requested from 
respondent. R.3, 26. 
4. Appellant Bryan W. Cannon is an attorney practicing 
law in Salt Lake City, Utah. R.6-7, 30-31. 
5. Respondent declined to loan appellants money. R.4, 
27, 45. 
6. Respondent never committed to make a loan to 
appellants on the terms set forth in their complaint, or on 
any other terms. R.45. 
7. No documents authored or subscribed by respondent, 
its agents or employees, exist, or have ever existed, in the 
files and records of respondent referring or relating in any 
way to respondent's alleged offer to loan money to 
appellants. R.45. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The possibilities (1) that respondent could have 
completely performed its alleged obligations within one 
year, or (2) that appellants conceivably might have repaid a 
30-year loan within one year, are insufficient to take this 
case out of the Statute of Frauds. Bilateral contracts 
performable by one party, but not by the other, within one 
year are void under the one-year provision of the Statute of 
Frauds. For purposes of the one-year provision of the 
Statute of Frauds, the parties' intention concerning the 
-6-
time for repayment, not the speculative possibility of 
repayment within one year, controls. 
2. Because (1) it is undisputed there dre no writings 
sufficient to take the alleged oral agreement out of the 
Statute of Frauds; (2) appellants never 
discovery whatsoever despite ample time t 
(3) appellants failed to file an affidavit 
they were unjustifiably prevented from conducting necessary 
discovery, the District Court properly rejected appellants' 
untimely invocation of Rule 56(f). 
attempted any 
\D do so; and 
demonstrating 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE ORAL AGREEMENT ALLEGED BY APPELLANTS 
IS VOID UNDER THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
At pages 10-13 of their brief, appellants make two 
alleged oral 
First, they 
related, but different, arguments why the 
contract is not within the Statute of Frauds 
argue that even if performance "is highly improbable or not 
expected by the parties'1 within a year, the Statute of 
Frauds is inapplicable if performance is nevertheless even 
remotely possible. Second, appellants argu^ that because 
respondent could have disbursed funds within 
Statute of Frauds is similarly inapplicab]J 
below, neither contention has merit. 
one year, the 
e. As shown 
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A. The remote possibility of repayment within one year 
of an alleged oral agreement intended by the 
parties to extend over thirty years does not take 
the alleged agreement out of the Statute of Frauds, 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4(1) reads: 
Certain agreements void unless written and 
subscribed. In the following casesf every 
agreement shall be void unless such agreement, 
or some note or memorandum thereof, is in 
writing subscribed by the party to be charged 
therewith: 
(1) Every agreement that by its terms is 
not to be performed within one year from 
the making thereof. . . . 
With respect to their first argument, appellants 
apparently argue that since it is remotely possible they 
could have repaid the alleged thirty-year loan within one 
year, the Statute of Frauds is inapplicable. This doctrine 
has no application to this case. 
In Ellis v. Royster, (Tenn. Ct. App. April 12, 1984) (a 
copy of the Royster opinion is included as Exhibit ,fBM to 
the Addendum), the plaintiffs allegedly loaned defendant and 
his wife money with repayment to occur over 48 months. The 
trial court entered summary judgment for the defendant on 
the grounds that the Tennessee Statute of Frauds provision 
functionally identical to Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4(1) barred 
the action. 
The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the Statute of 
Frauds was inapplicable because the defendant could have 
paid the debt in full at any time after making the debt; 
-8-
specifically that defendants obligation could have been 
performed within one year after the date of the loan. In 
affirming the trial court, the Tennessee Court of Appeals 
held: 
The applicable rule is the statute is limited 
to contracts which by a fair and reasonable 
interpretation of the terms used by the 
parties, and in view of all the circumstances, 
does not admit of its performance according to 
its language and contention within a year from 
the time of its making . . . The test is not, 
as the plaintiffs argue, that the debt could 
have been paid in full in one year but rather 
what the understanding of the parties was/ 
The understanding under plaintiffs theory and 
the documents in evidence establish that 
payments in satisfaction of the alleged loan 
would extend repayments beyond a period of one 
year. ~~ • ' 
Roysterf Slip Opinion, Addendum Exhibit ffBfj, at 2nd printed 
LEXIS page (citations omitted) (emphasis added). In other 
words, in an alleged contract to loan money| the test is not 
whether or not the loan might have possibly been paid within 
a year; rather, the critical inquiry is the alleged period 
over which repayment was expected by the parties to be made, 
in this case, 30 years. 
Similarly, in Sophie v. Ford, 230 A.DJ 568, 245 N.Y.S. 
470 (App. Div. 1930), plaintiff sued defendant on an alleged 
oral promise to pay a third party $200.00 levery four weeks 
for two years. Defendant performed for one year and then 
stopped making payments, and plaintiff sued to recover the 
remaining installments. The trial court rjuled the alleged 
-9-
oral agreement was enforceable, but the appellate division 
of the New York Supreme Court reversed: 
It is manifest that the bargain between the 
parties must be construed as one to pay [the 
third party] for the two succeeding years the 
salary which he might have been receiving as 
financial secretary of the Rochester Council 
of the Knights of Columbus, the same to be 
paid at the rate of $200 every four weeks. 
Neither plaintiff, nor [the third person], for 
whose benefit the contract was made, could 
have compelled the payment of any installment 
before the day it became due. Only one-half 
of the installments fell due within the year 
following the making of the contract. The 
agreement was clearly executory. It is 
evident, therefore, that it was not to be 
performed within a year from the making 
thereof . . . is void, and cannot be enforced. 
Id. at 472. Once again, then, the court ruled that an 
agreement to pay money for a period extending beyond one 
year is barred by the one-year provision of the Statute of 
In Gibbons v. Stillwell, 149 Ill.App.3d 411, 500 N.E.2d 
965 (1986), plaintiffs sued their attorneys for malpractice 
arising from legal advice the attorneys gave plaintiffs in 
connection with a bank's alleged breach of an oral agreement 
to loan plaintiff $275,000 at a rate of interest of 12-3/4% 
for a term of 20 years. After the bank refused to lend 
money on those terms, but offered to loan money at a higher 
rate of interest to vary with the bank's prime rate, 
plaintiff requested his attorneys to advise him regarding 
his rights against the bank. Id^ at 967. 
-10-
Citing the Illinois equivalent of Utah Code Ann. § 25-
5-4(1), the trial court granted defendants 
on the grounds that the alleged agreement could not be 
performed within one year, id. at 968, a 
court affirmed: "Since the alleged oral 
have been within the Statute of Frauds, 
advice that it was unenforceable was, as 
found, proper legal advice under the pircumstances as 
pleaded." Id. at 970. Once again, then,I an agreement to 
make a loan to be repaid over' a period loinger than a year 
was held void under the one-year provision pf the Statute of 
Frauds. 
Neither case cited by appellants at bage 11 of their 
brief is to the contrary. In Christensen y. Christensen, 9 
summary judgment 
|nd the appellate 
agreement would 
the defendants' 
the trial court 
Utah.2d 102, 339 P.2d 101 (1959), there | was no explicit 
agreement regarding the time within which performance was to 
occur; the Utah Supreme Court merely notep that because no 
such time was agreed upon, it was easily 
parties to have performed within a yearl 
Similarly, in Hageman & Pond, Inc. v. Cla| 
238 P.2d 919 (1951), there was no explicit|agreement by the 
parties that performance would extend beyjond one year, as 
there allegedly was in this case. 
possible for the 
Id. at 103. 
rk, 69 Wyo. 154, 
No reported Utah appellate decision 
that an oral agreement to loan money for 
explicitly holds 
longer than one 
-11-
year is void under the provisions of Utah Code Ann* § 25-5-
4(1), but several cases indicate in dicta that such 
agreements cannot be proven and are void. 
The first such case is Commercial Security Bank v. 
Hodson, 15 Utah.2d 388, 393 P.2d 482 (1964). In Hodson, the 
bank sued to collect a promissory note, and the defendants 
counterclaimed for the bank's alleged breach of an agreement 
to loan them money. The trial court directed a verdict in 
favor of the bank on its claim, awarded the defendants only 
one dollar as nominal damages on their counterclaim, and the 
defendants appealed. 
In reversing the trial court's award of only nominal 
damages to defendants on their counterclaim, the Utah 
Supreme Court noted: "The exact length of time that this 
loan should last is not specified, but there is nothing in 
the evidence which indicates that the loan should not 
terminate in less than a year.11 Id. at 48 5 (emphasis 
added). Although § 25-5-4(1) was not specifically addressed 
in Hodson, the above language strongly implies that the 
Statute of Frauds would have barred proof of the purported 
agreement had the loan been intended to extend beyond one 
year. In the present appeal, of course, appellants1 
performance would not terminate for 30 years. 
I n M & S Constr. & Eng'g Co. v. Clearfield State Bank, 
19 Utah.2d 36, 426 P.2d 227 (1967), the jury found that 
-12-
defendant bank had orally agreed to loan plaintiff money "as 
and when required" by plaintiff. Id. at 228. The trial 
court entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the 
grounds that the alleged agreement was void under § 25-5-
4(1). On plaintiff's appeal, the bank argued that the loan 
was not to be repaid within one year because of language 
contained in a separate contract. In reversing the trial 
court, the Utah Supreme Court held that the separate 
contract was legally irrelevant to the alleged agreement to 
loan money: 
You look at the terms of the contract claimed 
to be vulnerable to the statute. In this 
casef it was the loan agreement/ — not a 
separate contract of the borrower with someone 
else, the terms of which latter might be fixed 
as requiring performance two or ten years 
beyond the year period. 
Id. (emphasis added). Once again, then, the Utah Supreme 
Court has implied that proof of an alleged contract to loan 
money for longer than one year, if such period were 
explicitly made part of the alleged contract, would be 
barred by § 25-5-4(1). 
Finally, in Taylor v. Turner, 27 UtaA. 2d 39, 492 P.2d 
1343 (1972), plaintiffs sued to recover money loaned to 
defendant. The trial court awarded plaintiffs judgment, and 
the defendant appealed, relying, in part, on § 25-5-4(1). 
In affirming the trial court, the Utah Supr erne Court wrote: 
Defendant contends that if there were an oral 
agreement to loan money, such an agreement is 
-13-
barred by the Statute of Frauds, Section 25-5-
4(1} , OcC.A 1953, as an agreement which by 
its terms is not to be performed within one 
year from the making thereof. . . . 
[Plaintiff] testified that defendant requested 
a loan for a period of six months to one 
year. An oral promise to pay within a year is 
valid and not within the Statute of Frauds, 
Id. at 1345 (emphasis added). There is only one way this 
language can be read: When a promise to pay extends beyond 
one year, proof of the alleged agreement is barred by the 
provisions of § 25-5-4(1). 
In summary, there is no support for appellants1 
apparent contention that the bar of § 25-5-4(1) is somehow 
removed by the mere speculative possibility of repayment 
within one year of a loan intended by the parties to be 
repaid over 30 years. 
B. The Statute of Frauds applies to bilaterial 
agreements performable within one year by one party 
but not by the other. 
Appellants contend, at pages 11-12 of their brief, that 
"in order for a bilateral contract to be subject to the one-
year provision of the statute of frauds, performance by both 
parties must extend beyond one year, and not merely 
performance by one party.11 In fact, the rule is the 
opposite: 
A bilateral contract is one that includes 
promises by both parties and therefore 
requires a performance in the future by each 
of them. If either of these performances is 
one that cannot be completed within one year, 
-14-
the whole contract is within t)ie one year 
clause of the statute as long as 
remains bilateral — that is, 
neither party has fully performed his part. 
The fact that the performance promised by the 
the contract 
as long as 
other party is one that can be completed 
within one year does not take the case out of 
the one-year clause; and the contract is 
unenforceable by either party unless he has a 
sufficient memorandum signed by th e other. 
A. Corbin, 2 Corbin on Contracts § 456 aq 
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted). This 
law is consistent with the plain language 
page 572 (1950) 
statement of the 
of § 25-5-4(1), 
which renders void ff[e]very agreement that 
not to be performed within one year 
thereof." Appellants request this Court 
words "unless one party seeking to enforce 
completed performance within that per 
by 
from 
to 
the 
iod" 
its terms is 
the making 
engraft the 
contract has 
onto the 
statute. This Court should, howeverl decline that 
invitation. Section 25-5-4(1), by its terms, refers to 
every "agreement". An agreement is an entire thing, not 
divisible, and where that agreement cannot be completely 
executed, on both sides, until more than a ye 
the case falls within the express words of § 
The alleged agreement in this case 
inasmuch as neither party has fully perfoj 
Utah law is clear, moreover, that even actual full 
performance by one of the parties to an alleged oral 
agreement intended by the parties to extendi beyond one year 
ear has elapsed, 
25-5-4(1). 
e is bilateral 
rmed thereunder. 
will not entitle a party to recover upon the alleged oral 
agreement. 
In Fabian v. Wasatch Orchard Co., 41 Utah 404, 125 P. 
860 (1912), plaintiff sued defendant on an alleged oral 
agreement providing that if plaintiff would visit specified 
eastern cities for the purpose of advertising and 
introducing defendant's products into those markets, 
defendant would give plaintiff (1) the exclusive right for 
three years to sell defendant's products in Utah and 
southern Idaho, and (2) a 2\% commission on all sales of 
defendant's products made by anyone in Utah and southern 
Idaho during that three-year period. Plaintiff fully 
performed his obligations under the oral agreement within 35 
days after its making, but defendant repudiated the oral 
agreement. Plaintiff sued on the agreement, and the 
district court found it void under the one-year provision of 
the Statute of Frauds. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court 
affirmed that the oral agreement was unenforceable. Id. at 
861. 
The Utah Supreme Court has also specifically held more 
recently that the provisions of § 25-5-4(1) are not avoided 
by the full performance by one of the parties to an oral 
agreement requiring more than one year for its 
performance. In Bennett Leasing Co. v. Ellison, 15 Utah.2d 
72, 387 P.2d 246 (1963), plaintiff leasing company sued to 
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enforce an oral 24-month lease of an autbmobile. It is 
undisputed that plaintiff leasing company had fully 
performed by providing an automobile for 
the defendant had in fact used the aul 
months. Id, at 247. Despite the plainti 
defendant's use: 
tomobile for 22 
ff's actual full 
performance within one year, the trial court ruled as a 
matter of law that plaintiff's action on 
year oral lease was barred by § 25-5-4(1). 
notwithstanding that plaintiff had fully performed the 
alleged oral agreement within one year, the) majority opinion 
of the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling 
that the alleged oral agreement was void under § 25-5-
4(1). Id. at 248. Although two justices dissented from the 
opinion's specific holding, each of them sbecifically noted 
that the alleged oral agreement was void under § 25-5-
4(1). Id. at 248 (Henriod, J., dissenting); id. at 250 
(Callisterf J., dissenting). 
The law makes clear, then, that eyen actual, full 
the alleged two-
Id. On appeal, 
performance within one year by one pa 
agreement void under the one-year provision of the Statute 
void agreement 
respondent might 
of Frauds does not make the otherwise 
enforceable. Accordingly, the fact that 
have, or could have, loaned appellants mondy within one year 
does nothing to take the alleged agreement out of the 
prohibition of § 25-5-4(1). 
rty to an oral 
— 1 ~ 7 _ 
II. 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY ENTERED 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT; RULE 56(f) DOES NOT HELP 
APPELLANTS BECAUSE THEY FAILED TO 
INVOKE ITS PROVISIONS TIMELY OR PROPERLY. 
A. There are no disputed issues of material fact. 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and properly 
supported, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of his pleadings, but his response, 
by affidavits or as otherwise provided for, must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial. Brigham Truck and Implement Co. v. Fridal, 71 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 9, 10 (1987) (citing, Cowen and Co. v. Atlas Stock 
Transfer Co. , 695 P.2d 109 (Utah 1984)). Appellants have 
failed to identify any disputed issue of material fact. 
At page 9 of their Brief, appellants identify the 
single allegedly disputed issue of material fact germane to 
this appeal: "Particular documents were essential to 
Plaintiffs' defense to Defendant's Motion based on the 
statute of frauds where the existence of sufficient writings 
to satisfy the statute was alleged by Plaintiff Bryan 
Cannon's Affidavit. (R.32-40). Plaintiffs had not had an 
opportunity, however, to obtain copies of the documents 
Plaintiffs believe exist in Defendant's files." Appellants1 
Brief at p. 9. 
The Affidavit of Bryan W. Cannon referred to in 
Appellants' Brief (the "Cannon Affidavit") is the only 
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document appellants filed in opposition 
Motion for Summary Judgment. (A copy 
Affidavit is contained at R.32-40, is included as Exhibit 
to respondent's 
of the Cannon 
"C" to the Addendum, and is incorporated 
reference.) An examination of Exhibit "j( 
contains only one assertion pertaining to 
disputed issue of material fact in thi^ 
existence or non-existence of documents 
files sufficient to provide the written memorandum necessary 
to defeat the provisions of § 25-5-4(1): 
10. Affiant believes that additional written 
herein by such 
C,f discloses it 
[the sole alleged 
appeal — the 
in respondent's 
documents evidencing the appli 
approval off and a loan to be made by 
Commonwealth to Affiant and spoupe exist in 
nine percent (9%) one (1) [sic] 
and records of Defendant. 
R.34; Addendum, Exhibit lfCff (emphasis addedb. 
cation for 
>
s
in the file 
Thus, the sole and exclusive basis 
contention that there are disputed issues 
arises from Bryan Cannon's "belief" that 
sufficient to defeat the provisions of § 2}5-5-4(l) exist in 
respondent's files. As a matter of lawl, however, Bryan 
Cannon's mere "belief" is insufficient to provoke a genuine 
issue of fact. 
Rule 56(e) reads, in part: 
for appellants' 
of material fact 
certain writings 
Supporting and opposing affidavi 
made on personal knowledge, shall 
Its shall be 
1 set forth 
such facts as would be admissible 
and shall show affirmatively that 
is competent to testify to the ma| 
in evidence, 
the affiant 
tters stated 
-1 q-
therein,
 e . When a motion for summary 
judgment is made and supported as provided in 
this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon 
the mere allegations or denials of his 
pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set 
forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so 
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, 
shall be entered against him. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) (emphasis added). 
Under Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e), an affidavit on mere 
information and belief, such as 11 10 of the Cannon 
Affidavit, is insufficient as a matter of law to provoke a 
genuine issue of fact. Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 
747, 748 (Utah 1985) • As a consequence, a legally 
sufficient opposing affidavit under Rule 56(e) 
[Mjust be made on personal knowledge of the 
affiant, and set forth facts that would be 
admissible in evidence and show that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters 
stated therein. Statements made merely on 
information and belief will be disregarded. 
Id. (quoting, Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation Corp., 29 
Utah.2d 274, 508 P.2d 538 (1973)). 
Prior to the hearing on its Motion for Summary 
Judgment, respondent replied to the Cannon Affidavit with an 
Affidavit of Robert Bradley Meadows (the "Meadows 
Affidavit"). R.44-46. (A copy of the Meadows Affidavit is 
contained at R.44-46, is included as Exhibit "D" to the 
Addendum, and is incorporated herein by such reference.) In 
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response to the Cannon Affidavit/ the Meadows Affidavit 
contains the following sworn testimony: 
7. Contrary to Bryan Cannoq 
expressed in 11 10 of his Aff 
documents authored or subscribed b^ 
its agents or employees exist, or 
existed, in the files and records d 
referring or relating in any 
defendant's alleged offer to loan money to 
plaintiffs; this is so because defendant never 
approved a loan to plaintiffs and never 
authorized or approved a loan cojfnmitment to 
plaintiffs. 
fs belief 
(Ldavitf no 
defendant, 
have ever 
f defendant 
way to 
8. I know the statements contained in 11 7 of 
this Affidavit are true because any such 
documents would have to be reviewed by me, and 
would have to be contained in 
application file. I neither wrote 
such documents, and plaintiff's 
file does not contain, and 
contained, such documents. 
plaintiff's 
or received 
application 
has never 
R.45; Addendum, Exhibit "D". 
Not only, therefore, does the Cannon Affidavit fail to 
establish a disputed issue of material fact sufficient to 
defeat the provisions of § 25-5-4(1), but the Meadows 
Affidavit provides competent and uncontroyerted admissible 
testimony that no such documents exist. Accordingly, there 
was no disputed issue of material fact aj: the hearing on 
respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
judgment entered by the District Court was proper under Rule 
56(e). 
B. Appellants did not properly or t imely invoke the 
provisions of Rule 56(f). 
Rule 56(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides: 
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When affidavits are unavailable. Should it 
appear from the affidavits of a party opposing 
the motion that he cannot for reasons stated 
present by affidavit facts essential to 
justify his opposition, the court may refuse 
the application for judgment or may order a 
continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or 
discovery to be had or he may make such other 
order as is just* 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f) (emphasis added). 
Appellants cite, at page 9 of their Brief, the case of 
Caplinger v. Carter, 9 Kan.App. 2d 287, 676 P.2d 1300 
(1984), for the proposition that "summary judgment should 
not be entered where the opposing party is proceeding with 
due diligence with pretrial discovery but has not had an 
opportunity to complete it." Appellants fail, however, to 
disclose in their brief the application the Kansas court 
made of this rule: 
However, plaintiffs had done little discovery 
in the state court action and had allowed a 
limitation on discovery set by the court for 
July 15, 1982 to expire. "The control of 
discovery is entrusted to the discretion of 
the trial court." . . . We are not prepared 
to say that the court abused its discretion in 
adhering to the discovery limitations 
established in February of 1982. The summary 
judgment decision cannot be overturned simply 
because discovery was incomplete. 
Id. at 1305 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
For Rule 56(f) to apply at all, an opposing party must 
file an affidavit complying with the Rulefs requirements; in 
the absence of such an affidavit, the appellate court should 
refuse to consider an argument that further discovery was 
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necessary. Callioux v. Progressive Ins. C6., 70 Utah Adv. 
Layton City, 743 Rep. 32, 34 (App. 1987) (citing, Jackson v, 
P.2d 1196, 1198 (Utah 1987)). In such a^ affidavit, the 
party opposing summary judgment 
must show to the best of his ability what 
facts are within the movant's 
knowledge or control; what steps 
taken to obtain the desired 
pursuant to discovery procedures 
Rules; and that he is desirous 
exclusive 
have been 
information 
under the 
of taking 
advantages of these discovery procedures. 
Id. at 33 (quoting, 2 J. Moore, W. Tagga 
Moore's Federal Practice par. 56.24 (2d ed. 
added)). In short, ff 'filing an affidavit 
the preservation of a Rule 56(f) contention that summary 
judgment should be delayed pending furthe 
Id. (quoting, Mid-South Grizzlies v. National Football 
rt & J. Wicker, 
1987) (emphasis 
is necessary for 
r discovery.' 
League, 720 F.2d 772, 780 n.4 (3d Cir. 19831). 
In this case, appellants failed to comply at any time 
with the procedures necessary to invoke tpe provisions of 
Rule 56(f). The only affidavit of any 
appellants is the Cannon Affidavit included as Exhibit "C" 
to the Addendum. There is nothing in ^xhibit "C" that 
satisfies the requirements of Rule 56(f). 
nature filed by 
The Complaint in this matter was filed 
R.2; the hearing on respondent's Motion for 
did not take place until July 10, 1987, aj 
on May 15, 1987, 
Summary Judgment 
lmost two months 
later. R.21, 59. During this intervening 56-day period, 
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appellants made absolutely no efforts to conduct discovery 
of any sort; this Court has specifically noted that a mere 
17-day period provides "ample time" within which to oppose a 
motion pursuant to the provisions of Rule 56(f). Id. at 
34. Accordingly, this Court is in no position to " 'spare 
the litigants from their own lack of diligence. f " Id. 
(quoting, Herbert v. Wicklund, 744 F.2d 218f 222 (1st Cir. 
1984) ) . 
Moreover, as demonstrated in point II.A., supra, it is 
undisputed that the only documents purportedly undiscovered 
by appellants — documents sufficient to satisfy the Statute 
of Frauds (Appellants' Brief, p. 10) — do not exist, and 
have never existed. R.45; Addendum, Exhibit "D". 
Accordingly, a Rule 56(f) affidavit would serve no probative 
purpose, because "[i]f the most that can be hoped for is a 
chance to discredit the affiants' statement or focus on 
demeanor, no question of material fact is presented." Id. 
(citing, Modern Home Institute, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & 
Indemnity Co., 513 F.2d 102, 110 (2nd Cir. 1975)). 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent's alleged oral agreement to loan appellants 
money to be repaid over 30 years is void under Utah Code 
Ann. § 25-5-4(1). Neither the speculative possibility of 
that loan's repayment within one year, nor the fact that 
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respondent might have, or could have, disbursed funds within 
one year is sufficient to remove the bar 
Moreover, there was no disputed issue of material fact 
of § 25-5-4(1). 
before the District Court at the hearing on respondent's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, and appellants• untimely and 
ineffective invocation of Rule 56(f) faifLs to create a 
disputed question of material fact. The sunpary judgment of 
the District Court should be affirmed. 
DATED January 6, 1988. 
HANSEN & ANDfiRSON 
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50 West Broadway, Sixth Floor 
Salt Lake Citjy, Utah 84101 
Attorneys fort Respondent 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
BRYAN W. CANNON and 
DANA R. CANNON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
COMMONWEALTH WESTERN 
MORTGAGE CORPORATION, an 
Oregon corporation, now known 
as COMMONWEALTH MORTGAGE 
CORPORATION OF AMERICA, 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM 
IN REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' 
AFFIDAVIT IN OPPOSITION 
TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS 
Civil No. C87-3337 
Judge Pat Brian 
* * * * * * * * 
Defendant Commonwealth Western Mortgage Corporation 
("Commonwealth") respectfully submits this Memorandum 'in Reply to Plaintiffs' 
Affidavit in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
I. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Commonwealth filed its Motion to Dismiss on June 4, 1987; 
Commonwealth received plaintiffs' Affidavit in Opposition to that Motion on June 
25, 1987.1 
II. 
ARGUMENT 
PLAINTIFFS1 AFFIDAVIT DOES NOTHING TO TAKE THE ALLEGED 
AGREEMENT OUT OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
A. The Disclosure Statement Does Not Prove the Alleged Agreement. 
Plaintiffs apparently assert that the Federal Truth in Lending Loan 
Disclosure Statement attached to the Jane 22, 1987, Affidavit of Bryan W. Cannon 
("Cannon Affidavit") as Exhibit "1" (the "Disclosure Statement") in some way 
proves Commonwealth's commitment to make the alleged loan to plaintiffs. For 
the reasons that follow, this is not the case. 
The Disclosure Statement specifically is denominated a "Federal Truth 
in Lending" Disclosure Statement. The Federal Truth in Lending Act ("TILA") is 
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. The congressional purpose in an enacting 
TIL A was as follows: 
The Congress finds that economic stabilization would be 
enhanced and the competition among various financial 
institutions and other firms engaged in the extension of 
consumer credit would be strengthened by the informed 
use of credit. The informed use of credit results from an 
awareness of the cost thereof by consumers. It is the 
purpose of this subchapter to assure a meaningful 
disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be 
able to compare more readily the various credit terms 
available to him and avoid the uninformed use of 
credit, . . . . 
15U.S.C. § 1601(a). 
In 1974, Congress specifically extended these policies to real estate 
mortgage loans when it enacted the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 
1By filing their Affidavit, plaintiffs have, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 
12(b), converted the pending motion into a motion for summary judgment. 
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first lien on residential 
et seq. After making 1974 ("RESPA"), which is codified at 12 U.S.C. § 2601 
findings and stating its purpose to be similar to TILAl, Congress, in RESPA, 
extended the protections of RESPA to all "federally related mortgage loans". 
That term was defined to be one which "is secured by a 
real property . . . designed principally for the occupancy of from one to four 
families; . . ." 12 U.S.C. § 2602(1)(A). 
In 1982, the Board of Governors of the Federal I 
at 12 CFR § 226, the regulations necessary to implement} 
("Reg. Z"). Reg. Z imposes specific duties with respect 
loans: 
The creditor shall make disclosures before consummation 
Reserve System issued, 
both TILA and RESPA 
to residential mortgage 
of the transaction. In certain residential 
transactions, special timing requirements are set forth in 
§226.19. 
12 CFR § 226.17(b) (emphasis added). "Consummation" }s defined as "the time 
that a consumer becomes contractually obligated on a credit transaction." 12 
CFR § 226.2(a)(13). In this regard, Reg. Z imposes the following legal obligations 
on a lender who has received an application for a loan respecting a residential 
mortgage: 
mortgage 
(a) Time of disclosure. In a residential mortgage 
transaction subject to [RESPA] the creditor shall make 
good faith estimates of the disclosures required by 
§ 226.18 before consummation, or shall deliver 
them in the mail not later than 3 business days 
creditor receives the consumer's written application, 
whichever is earlier. 
12 CFR § 226.19(a) (emphasis added). Reg. Z also contains sample forms to be 
used by lenders in order to comply with § 226. A copy 
included in Appendix G to Reg. Z ("Sample H-13") is attached hereto as Exhibit 
ff A f t A". Sample H-13 is functionally identical to Exhibit "1" to 
or place 
after the 
of sample form H-13 
the Cannon Affidavit. 
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In other words, Commonwealth was required by federal law to give 
Exhibit "1" to plaintiffs not later than three days after their application for 
credit. The federal purpose of this requirement was to allow plaintiffs to compare 
the cost of credit offered by Commonwealth as of December 22, 1986, with the 
costs of credit offered at that time by other lenders. Reg. Z makes clear that a 
lender's preparation of Sample H-13 at the time of a loan application in no way 
obligates the lender to make the loan described therein: 
(b) Redisclosure required. If the annual percentage rate 
in the consummated transaction varies from the annual 
percentage rate disclosed under § 226.18(e) by more than 
1/8 of 1 percentage point in a regular transaction or more 
than 1/4 of 1 percentage point in an irregular transaction, 
as defined in § 226.22, the creditor shall disclose the 
changed terms no later than consummation or settlement. 
12 CFR § 226.19(b). 
A lender's preparation of documents such as Sample H-13 and Exhibit 
"l" in no way constitute that lender's offer to make a loan. Instead, they merely 
represent what a loan actually consummated and made on the date of disclosure 
would look like. In fact, approximately 30% of the applications for loans received 
by Commonwealth never lead to a commitment to issue a loan. (Meadows 
Affidavit, 1f4.) In this regard, one Federal Court has noted that "the disclosure 
statement is not actually part of the contract between plaintiffs and 
defendants;.. . Rather, the statement is an ancillary document included because 
required by federal statute.'1 Tryst v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n of 
Chester, 466 F.Supp. 578, 594 (E.D. Pa. 1979). 
Because Exhibit "1" was prepared in response to federal law, and 
because it does not represent a legally sufficient offer to make a contract 
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n n n i 
between the parties, Exhibit "1" is insufficient to take the alleged agreement to 
loan money to plaintiffs out of the Statute of Frauds. 
B. Title Reports do not Take an Alleged Oral Agreement to Loan Money 
out of the Statute of Frauds. 
Plaintiffs apparently contend also that the title j reports attached to the 
Cannon Affidavit as Exhibits ff2fl and "3" (the "Title Repdrts") somehow take the 
alleged oral agreement outside the Statute of Frauds. This is not the case. In the 
first place, the Title Reports are in no way subscribeq by Commonwealth as 
specifically required by Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4. Moreover, even if the Title 
Reports were, they would not take Commonwealth's alleged agreement to loan 
money to plaintiffs out of the Statute of Frauds: 
[I]t is well established that incurring expenses fof a search 
of title and preparation of of [sic] the costs of 
improvements; arranging for financing for the purchase 
does not constitute sufficient part performance to take 
the case out of the requirements of the Statute of Frauds. 
Weale v. Massachusetts Gen. Housing Corp., 117 N.H. 428, 374 A.2d 925 (1977) 
(emphasis added; citations omitted). A copy of Weale is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "B,f; the quoted language appears at page 4 of the attached copy. 
Consequently, the Title Reports attached to the | Cannon Affidavit in no 
way take Commonwealth's alleged agreement to loan plaintiffs money out of the 
Statute of Frauds. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
The pleadings in this matter demonstrate that plaintiffs are barred by 
the Statute of Frauds from proving the agreement alleged in their Complaint. The 
record is devoid of any competent evidence that such ah agreement was ever 
made. Accordingly, Commonwealth should receive summkry judgment that the 
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cause of action asserted in plaintiffs1 Complaint is barred by the Statute of 
DATED July 6 , 1987. 
Frauds-2 
HANSEN & ANDERSON 
Bruce Wycoff 
50 West Broadway Sncfh Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the 6th day of July, 1987, I caused to be hand 
delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs' Affidavit in Opposition to Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss to the 
following: 
Dennis K. Poole 
Duane R. Smith 
POOLE, CANNON & SMITH 
4885 South 4180 West, Suite 306 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
£/y ,/}]. , A ^ 
^Of necessity, plaintiffs' Motion to File an Amended Complaint must 
similarly be denied because it similarly alleges nothing sufficient to take the 
alleged agreement out of the Statute of Frauds. 
(Continued) 
-6-
patrol R#s#rv# System 
^.13—Mortgage with Demand Feature Sample 
Part 226, App. G 
mortgage Savings and Loan Assoc, 
pate: April 15, 1981 700 
Glenn Jones 
Oak Drive 
Little Creek, USA 
ANNUAL 
PERCENTAGE 
RATE 
TH« eoit of vowr cr«d*t 
\4X* 
FINANCE 
CHARGE 
T*e do"*/ tmo*i*t 
?*t crtdu will cost 
VOU 
|5lp,55l5^ 
Amount 
Financed 
The jmoMAt ol c/td«f 
provided ce vou o* on 
^ ( o O S . f c f e 
Total of 
Payments 
The amount voo will 
Hevt o * d j f \*t you 
* * * • modi ati ptvmemf 
M«cfi«dui«d 
S40l,IS7.ai)| 
Your neyment schedule will be: 
Numoff o' ?av«m*i Amow** 5* • ivm*ri$ ' W*t« *av*»»c*?* Ar« Du« 
3L>a '*S5fr.T7 imor>d-Uu bg^mnir^ fa|i 1ft 
This obligation has a demand feature. 
You may obtain property insurance from anyone you want that is acceptable to Mortgage 
the insurance from Mortgage Savings and Loan Assoc, you wil l pay S. I S O -
Security: You if giving a security interest in: 
^Ek the goods or property being purchased. 
D 
Savings and Loan Assoc.. If you get 
Late Charge: If a payment •$ late, you will be charged S« I0L W not the payment. 
Prepayment: If you pay off tarty, you may have to pay a penalty. 
Assumption: Someone buying your house may, subject to conditions, bt allowed to assume the remainder of the mortgage on 
the original terms. 
See your contnct documents for any additional information about nonpayment, default, any required repayment m full before 
the scheduled date, and prepayment refunds §nt^ penalties. 
I t means an estimate 
000054 
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374 A.2d 925 printed in FULL format. 
WILLIAM U. WEALE & a. v. MASSACHUSETTS GENERAL HOUSING 
CORPORATION & a., STEPHEN C. COLE v. MASSACHUSETTS HOUSING 
CORPORATION & a. 
No. 7505 
Supreme Court of New Hampshire 
117 N.H. 428.; 374 A.2d 925 
May 31, 1977 
Grafton 
Stebbins & Bradley and Michael L. Slive, of Hanover (Mr, Sliye orally), for 
William W. Weale and William R. Jordan. 
Struckhaff & Kelly, of West Lebanon (Mr. Lawrence A. Kelly orally), for 
Stephen C. Cole. 
Massachusetts General Housing Corporation did not appear. 
LAMPRON 
LAMPRON, J. Bills in equity for specific performance of contracts to sell a 
parcel of land in West Lebanon. The first bill, by Weale and Jordan., is based 
on an oral agreement of purchase and sale between them and General Housing. The 
other, by Cole, arises from a later written agreement by General Housing to sell 
the same parcel to him. Hearing before Johnson, J., who made certain findings 
and rulings and ordered General Housing to convey the property to Weale and 
Jordan; oVdered Cole to file a release" of his recorded written agreement to 
purchase this land; and ordered General Housing to refund to Cole his $3,000 
deposit. We hold that the trial court's orders must be set aside. 
Massachusetts Housing purchased the 27 acres of land in question on July 11, 
1972, and on September ~14, 1972, executed a note for $25,000 to the National 
Eank of Lebanon, secured by a mortgage on this land. Edward J. Sylvia and Erwin 
Brand, the sole stockholders in this" corporation, signed as guarantors. As the 
terms of the note were not being met, the bank notified the signers that it was 
asking its attorney to prepare "foreclosure notices if payment was not made in 
full by February 15, 1974. 
As a result, Brand, on behalf of Massachusetts Housing, authorized Marchewka, 
a Lebanon realtor, to find a purchaser for the property. On or about February 
15, Weale and Jordan made a verbal offer of $25,000 which was rejected by Brand. 
However, on February 18 Brand authorized the realtor to sell the land "at no 
cost to us." This counteroffer was understood by all the parties to mean that 
the purchasers would pay the $25,000 note and all interest due, as well as the 
unpaid real estate taxes and the broker's commission. Weale and Jordan agreed 
to these terms and upon so learning Brand called it "a deal." The purchasers 
were notified to that effect. When Marchewka told the bank of this agreement 
the foreclosure proceedings were not initiated. 
Weale and Jordan secured a commitment from the Lebanon National Bank to 
finance the transaction. The bank attorney then made an examination af tAfinnj 
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title and prepared a mortgage deed for which Weale an$ Jordan were billed $150. 
In reliance on their oral agreement, the latter also engaged an engineer to make 
a preliminary survey and a "design for the subdivision!of the land. Weale and 
Jordan received an invoice in the amount of $2,860 fof this work. On March 21, 
1974, Weale and Jordan, the realtor, and officers of the bank met and agreed on 
a closing date of April 4, 1974. This date was chosen to accommodate Sylvia, 
the other stockholder with Brand of Massachusetts Housing. 
On March 28, 1974, plaintiff Stephen Cole learned 
Weale and Jordan. He went to West Lebanon and saw a 
evidence of recent survey work. Upon learning the id 
called Sylvia directly offering to purchase this land 
March 31, 1974, Cole and Sylvia signed a contract of 
f the proposed sale to 
:ract of land which bore 
ntity of the owner, Cole 
and on Sunday evening 
burchase and sale in 
Lebanon and a $3,000 deposit was made. The closing of the deal under this 
contract was scheduled for April 3, 1974, one day pri 
Weale and Jordan deal. Neither closing took place. 
The Statute of Frauds in this state provides as follows 
Land. No action shall be maintained upon a contract 
the agreement upon which it is brought or some memo 
and signed by the party to be charged,, or by some pe 
authorized by writing." Such a statute is intended tcj) 
protect from frauds and perluries in land transacti 
Perillo, Contracts § 282 (1970). 
ohs 
or to the closing of the 
learned of the contract 
reement containing the 
Meanwhile on April 1, 1974, Marchewka, the realtor^, 
between Cole and Massachusetts Housing. A written agji 
terms of the Weale and Jordan transaction was drawn and sent to Sylvia without a 
deposit. It was never executed by Massachusetts Housing. Both plaintiffs 
placed attachments an the land which still stands in 
Housing. 
the name of Massachusetts 
"RSA 506:1 Sale of 
far the sale of land unless 
r^ndum thereof, is in writing 
rjson by him thereto 
promote certainty and to 
. J. Calamari and J. 
However, a strict enforcement of the statute can produce frustration on the 
one hand, and unethical conduct on the other. Calamari and Perillo., supr^ § 
282. Hence the law seeks to alleviate the harshness of the statute when some 
operating facts./ such as fraud,, part performance or other eguitable 
considerations, are present. Mere refusal to carry put an oral promise to 
convey land standing by itself is not fraud or prounq for relief. 3 S. 
Williston, Contracts 8 533A, at 809 (Jaeger edf 196QL 
However., a .generally recognized ground for relief 
purchaser has "taken possession of the property with 
the seller and has made valuable improvements on the 
the transfer of title. Relief is based on the consideration that to enforce the 
statute would result in uniust enrichment to the seljLer or fraud on his part 
Sawin v. Carr, 114 N.H. 462, 323 A.2d 924 (1974); L. 
ed. 1965); Emery v. Dana, 76 N.H. 483, 488, 84 A. 97£, 978 (1912); White v. 
Poole, 74 N.H. 71, 65 A. 255 (1906). 
is when the prospective 
^he consent or knowledge of 
premises in anticipation of 
The trial court based its decree of specific performance in favor of Weale 
and Jordan on the following findings and rulings, "pe oral contract conveying 
real estate between Massachusetts "Housing and "the plaintiff Weale and Jordan wis 
legally binding because it (1) contained a readily ascertainable purchase price., 
(2) contained'the other necessary requisites of a rqal estate contract, and 
that in reliance upon this oral contract the plainti'" ffs contracted for 
(3) 
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extensive closing and development costs- In addition the plaintiffs assisted 
Massachusetts Housing in that their ofer, which was accepted by Massachusetts 
Housing, resulted in the National Bank of Lebanon foregoing further steps to 
foreclose on the property. The Court finds that the plaintiffs1 actions 
constituted sufficient part performance to take the contract out of the statute 
of frauds and make it a binding contract on the part of Massachusetts Housing-11 
The trial court properly found present one of the requirements to support a 
decree of specific performance, that is, that the terms of the oral agreewent 
between Weale and Jordan and Massachusetts Housing were definite and ~ 
ascertainable. Sawin v. Carr, 114 N.H. 462., 323 A.2d 924 (1974). However, it 
is well established that incurring expenses for a search of title and 
preparation of of the costs of improvements; arranging for financing for the 
purchase does not constitute sufficient part performance to take the case out 01 
the requirements of the Statute of Frauds. 3 S. Williston, Contracts S 494, at 
565 (Jaeger ed. 1960); 73 Am.Jur.2d Statute of Frauds § 409 (1974). 
Weale and Jordan were billed $150 for the mortgage deed and search of title 
and $2,860 for a preliminary survey and design of subdivision. However about 
half of the latter work was done after they had knowledge that Massachusetts 
Housing had signed a contract with Cole for the sale of this land. The 
abandonment of foreclosure proceedings did not constitute forbearance on the 
part of Weale and Jordan. They did not relinquish any rights or forbear to 
their deteriment to take action which they might otherwise have taken. The 
benefits, if any, which the lack of foreclosure by the bank conferred on 
Massachusetts Housing would not constitute unjust enrichment of the defendant at 
the expense of Weale and Jordan. 73 Am,Jur.2d Statute of Frauds S 453 (1974). 
Thus the equitable considerations usually relied on to constitute part 
performance to justify ordering specific performance of an oral agreement to 
sell land in order to prevent fraud or unjust enrichment on the part of the 
defendant have not been specifically found by the trial court. An examination 
of the record before us also reveals that it would not support an order taking 
the oral agreement of the parties out of the statutory requirement that an 
agreement to sell land must be in writinjj. 
The trial court properly ruled that the defense of the Statute of Frauds 
could be raised even thouqh it miqht not have been timely filed. Blanchard v. 
Calderwood, 110 N.H. 29, "260 A.2d"" 118 (1969); see Superior Court Rule No. 26, 
RSA 491: App.R._26 (Supp. 1975). However, the trial court's ruling that 
Massachusetts Housing and Cole were estopped from pleading the sta'tute was in 
error. The repudiation of the oral contract by Massachusetts Housing was not in 
itself conduct which gives rise to estoppel. Nor does the action of Cole in 
takinq advantaje of the fact that Weale and Jordan had an unenforceable contract 
to purchase this land. To hold that they are estopped to assert the defense of 
the statute in the absence of part performance sufficient to constitute an 
equitable consideration to grant relief to the purchaser would amount to a 
virtual repeal of the statute itself. 2 A. Corbin, Contracts S 422A (Supp. 
1971); see D. Dobbs, Remedies 8 13.2, at 963 (1973); Annot., 56 A.L.R.3d 1037, 
1077 (1974). The decree of the trial court is set aside and the order is 
Exceptions of Cole sustained. 
DOUGLAS, J., did not sit; the others concurred. ' 
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DISPOSITION: 
Exceptions of Cole sustained. 
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ces of Mead Data Central 
16TH CASE of Level 1 printed in FULL format. 
MR. AND MRS. SAM E. ELLIS, Plaintiffs-Appellants, VS. JOHN 
M. ROYSTER, SR., Defendant-Appellee. 
Court of Appeals of Tennessee, Eastern Section 
Slip Opinion 
April 12, 1984 
ANDERSON LAW. 
HONORABLE JAMES B. SCOTT, JR., JUDGE. 
Franks., J. wrote the opinion. CONCUR: James W. Parrtott, P.J., Clifford E. 
Sanders, J. 
JOSEPH H. VAN HOOK, Oliver Springs, for plaintiffs-appellants. 
J. MICHAEL LAIN, Oak Ridge, for defendant-appellee. 
Franks 
Franks, J. 
In this action for debt, the trial judge entered su^ma 
defendant on the grounds that the Statute of Frauds n1 
n1 The provision of the statute pertinent to this action is: 
T.C.A. 
brought: 
§ 29-2-101. Writing required for action. 
(5) Upon any agreement or contract which is not to 
space of one (1) year from the making thereof: unless 
upon which such action shall be brought, or some memorandum 
shall be in writing, and signed by the party to be changed 
other person by hfm thereunto lawfully authorized. 
The complaint alleges defendant and his wife borrowed 
plaintiffs which was to be repaid "over a period of ti 
basis." The complaint further avers the defendant owes 
plus interest in the amount, as set out in the promissp 
plaintiffs to the Bank of Oak Ridge. 
ry judgment for 
bars this action. 
the 
No action shall be 
pe performed within the 
he promise or agreement, 
or note thereof, 
therewith, or some 
$5,894.76 from 
(ne on a monthly payment 
the plaintiffs $2,947.38 
ry note executed by the 
Plaintiffs, responding to a motion for a more specific statement, filed a 
copy of the note dated April 26, 1979, wherein the plaintiffs borrowed $4,326.72 
from the Bank of Oak Ridge; a letter dated March 25, 1983, from the assistant 
vice-president of the bank to their attorney which, in substance, states the 
proceeds from the loan made to the plaintiffs "were used as a down payment on a 
house for their daughter, Party Royster, and husband. Payments were to be paid 
by Patty Royster, daughter." Another notation filed, apparently from the bank 
records, was to the effect that plaintiffs were loaned[$4,326.72 for 48 months, 
with the daughter to make payments on the loan. 
EXHIRiT B 
Slip Opinion 
Responding to defendant's motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs filed a 
copy of a check dated Hay 1, 1979, payable to John M. Royster and Patricia E. 
Royster in the amount of $5,894*76, with the notation for "home" and signed by 
plaintiff, Mrs. Ellis. The back of the check shows an endorsement by defendant 
and his former wife, Patricia E. Royster. 
Plaintiffs argue the Statute of Frauds is not applicable, insisting the 
defendant could have paid the debt in full at any time after making the debt, 
i.e., within one year after the date of the loan. The applicable rule is 
the statute is limited to contracts which by a fair and reasonable 
interpretation of the terms used by the parties, and in view of all the 
circumstances, does not admit of its performance according to its language and 
intention within a year from the time of its making. Johnston v. Cincinnatti 
N.O. & T.P. Ry. Co.', 146 Tenn. 135, 240 S.W. 429 (1921); Anderson-Gregory Co. v. 
Lea, 51 Tenn.App. 612, 370 S.W.2d 934 (1963). The trial court's determination 
finds support in application of this rule. The test is not, as the plaintiffs 
argue, that the debt could have been paid in full in one year but rather what 
the understanding of the parties was. The understanding under plaintiffs' 
theory and the documents in evidence establish that payments in satisfaction of 
the alleged loan would extend repayments beyond a period of one year. 
Plaintiffs further argue there are sufficient notes and documents and other 
memoranda surrounding the transaction to take the contract out of the Statute 
of Frauds. The general rule of law pertaining to this issue is stated in 
Lambert v. Home Federal Sayings and Loan Association, 481 S.W.2d 770 (Tenn. 
1972), and is that a memorandum, in order to satisfy the Statute of Frauds, must 
contain the essential terms of the contract expressed with such certainty that 
they may be understood from the memorandum or some other writing to which it 
refers or with which it is connected without resorting to parorevidence. The 
only instrument signed by the defendant in this record was his endorsement on 
the check from plaintiffs which, standing alone, does not establish any debt. 
The note and documents in the form of bank records and a letter from a bank 
officer are not statements made by defendant nor "by some other person by him 
thereunto lawfully authorized." In Re Estate of Dickerson, 600 S.W.2d 714 (Tenn. 
1980). Moreover, were the documents properly admissible in evidence, a 
contractual obligation requiring the defendant to pay monies to the plaintiffs 
would not be established. 
Finally, plaintiffs contend they did not have a chance to offer to the trial 
court "the various contracts, notes, testimony of witnesses and other documents 
which surrounded the loan transaction." There is no suggestion in the record 
that other documentary evidence relating to the alleged contract was available; 
moreover, ample provision is made under" T.R.C.P., Rule 56, for the filing of 
affidavits where probative oral testimony would create a disputed issue of 
material fact. The issues are resolved against plaintiffs. 
We affirm the judgment of the trial court and remand at plaintiffs* cost. 
CONCUR: James W. Parrott, P.J., Clifford E. Sanders, J. 
DISPOSITION: 
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED. 
k CWIC a#^v#^* • mTa& »»^w» 
DENNIS K. POOLE, #2625 
DUANE R. SMITH, #2996 
POOLE, CANNON & SMITH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4885 South 900 East, Suite 306 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone (801) 263-3344 
\>. >••••> 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURt OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
BRYAN W. CANNON and 
DANA R. CANNON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
COMMONWEALTH WESTERN 
MORTGAGE CORPORATION, an 
Oregon corporation, now known 
as COMMONWEALTH MORTGAGE 
CORPORATION OF AMERICA, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT IN OPPOSITION 
TO (DEFENDANTS MOTION TO 
DISMISS 
Civil No. C87-3337 
Judge Pat Brian 
* * * * * * * 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Bryan W. Cannon, being firsp duly sworn, upon oath, 
hereby deposes and says as follows: 
1. He is one of the Plaintifffs in the above-entitled 
action. 
2. That on or about December 15, 1986, he met with 
Brad Meadows, Manager of the Salt Lake Office of Commonwealth 
Western Mortgage Corporation, now knowl 
Corporation of America (herein "Commonwealth" or "Defendant"), 
for purpose of discussing a loan by Commonwealth to Affiant and 
his spouse. 
as Commonwealth Mortgage 
000032 
3. At the time of such conference with Brad Meade 
Mr* Meadows represented to Affiant that Affiant and Affian 
spouse could receive a loan, after qualification, with an int 
est rate of nine percent (9%) and one (1) point origination fe 
4. Mr. Meadows requested that Plaintiffs supply S 
with a written loan application. Plaintiffs supplied s< 
written application to Defendant, Commonwealth, on or ab< 
December 16, 1987. 
5. To confirm said application Defendant mai! 
Plaintiffs a Federal Truth and Lending Loan Disclosure Statemei 
a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "1". Said stat 
ment is believed to have been prepared by Defendant through i 
agents and clearly identifies the parties and terms of the lc 
offered to Plaintiffs. 
6. After receivers said application, Defendant r 
quested and received a written appraisal on Plaintiff's hom 
which reflects an appraised value of $129,500.00. 
7. On or about April 27, 1987, Defendant requested a 
received a written commitment for title insurance from Sure 
Title. Agency of Salt Lake City, Utah, under their File N< 
17023W, which title report committed to issue a ALTA Lender 
Policy in the amount of $116,500.00 for the benefit of Defendani 
a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "2". 
8. On at least two occasions, Brad Meadows request* 
that Surety Title order payoff information from City Mortgac 
Company, the present first mortgage holder on the residence c 
-2- ooooa; 
Plaintiffs. Said requests were made in writing by Surety Title 
Agency to City Mortgage Company. 
9. Plaintiffs received a written request from Defen-
dant to provide explanation of credit information so that the 
loan processing could be completed. Plaintiffs provided a 
written response for said credit information to the Defendant; 
Said written response was obtained from Affiant by Brad Meadows. 
3<i itional written documents 
of, and a loan to be made 
10. Affiant believes that adc
evidencing the application for approval! 
by Commonwealth to Affiant and spouse ^xist in nine percent (9%) 
one (1) in the file and records of Defendant. 
11. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant did not refuse to 
make a loan to Plaintiffs, but only th^t Commonwealth refused to 
make a loan for the rate and terms to 
agreed. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHTJ 
DATED this day of June, 1987. 
which they had previously 
Subscribed and sworn to £e1:or£ me this ^JL^ day of 
June, 1987. 
My Commission Expires: 
November 19, 1990 
NUTARY PUBLie 6 ~ 
Residing at Murray, Utah 
-3- 000034 
FEDERAL TRUTH IN LENDING LOAN DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 
nATf DECEMBER 22, 1986 
LOAN NUMBER 800343 
BORROWERS NAME 
BORROWERS NAME 
BRYANE W. CANNON 
DANA R. CANNON 
LOANAMOUNTS 1 2 1 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 A00RESS 
10307 SOUTH EDGECLIFF DRIVE 
SANDY, UT 8 4 0 9 2 
C R E D | T 0 R COMMONWEALTH MORTGAGE COMPANY OF AMERICA, L . P . A DELAWARE LIMITED PARTNERSH 
ANNUAL PERCENTAGE 
RATE 
The cost of your credit as 
a yearly rate 
9 .257 % 
FINANCE CHARGE 
The dollar amount me 
credit will cost you 
2 3 3 , 1 7 7 . 1 0 
AMOUNT FINANCED 
The amount of credit 
Drovided to you or on your 
behalf 
118 ,766 .10 
TOTAL OF PAYMENT 
The amount you will h 
paid after you have mi 
all payments as schedi 
3 5 1 , 9 4 3 . 2 0 
PAYMENTS: Your payment schedule will be 
Number of 
Payments 
360 
Amount of 
Payments 
977.62 
When Payments 
are Due 
Monthly 
Beginning 
2/01/1987 
Number of 
Payments 
Amount of 
Payments 
When Payments 
are Due 
Monthly 
Beginning 
Number of 
Payments 
Amount of 
Payments 
When Payr 
are Du 
Monthi 
Beginnn 
This obligation JS does D does not have a demand feature. 
INSURANCE: 
Credit Life Insurance and Credit Disability Insurance are not required to obtain credit 
You may obtain Property Insurance from anyone you want that is acceptable to credit 
If you desire Homeowner's Insurance from Commonwealth Mortgage Company of America L P your premium will be 3 
SECURITY: 
You are giving a security interest in the property located at 
10307 SOUTH EDGECLIFF DRIVE, SANDY, UT 84092 
FILING FEES: $ . 
5.0 %< 
LATE CHARGE. 
If payment is not received within FIfcTttEN days of its due date, you will be charged 
past due installment or $ 48 . 88 , whichever sum is greater 
PREPAYMENT: 
If you pay off early, you Q may GDCwill not have to pay a penalty 
D may (SXwill not be entitled to a refund of part of the finance charge. 
ASSUMPTION: 
Someone buying your house U may C may, subject to conditions, £? may not assume the remainder of your loan o 
original terms. 
REQUIREO DEPOSIT: 
The annual percentage rate does not take into account your required deposit 
See your contract documents ror any additional information about nonpayment default, and required repayment in full b 
the scheduled date, and prepayment refunds and penalties 
I desire an itemization of amount financed Yes D No G 
DANA R. CANNON BRYANE W. CANNON 
All dates and numerical disclosures except the late payment disclosures are estimates 
FEDERAL TRUTH IN LENDING LOAN (DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 
0A7 t DECEMBER 22, 1936 
LOAN NUMBER 800343 
BORROWERS NAME . 
BRYANE W. CANNON 
BORROWERS NAME . 
DANA R. CANNON 
LOANAMOUNTS 1 2 1 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 ADDRESS 
10307 SOUTH EDGECLIFF DRIVE 
SANDY, UT 84092 
CREDITOR CCMMONWEALIH JORTGAGE COMPANY OF AMERICA,! L . P . A DELAWARE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP 
ANNUAL PERCENTAGE 
RATE 
The cost of your credit as 
a yearly rate 
9.257 % 
FINANCE CHARGE 
The dol lar amount the 
credit wi l l cost you 
2 3 3 . 1 7 7 . 1 0 
AMOUNT FINANCED 
Trpe amount of credit 
prov|ded to you or on your 
behalf 
1 1 8 , 7 6 6 . 1 0 
TOTAL OF PAYMENTS 
The amount you wil l have 
paid after you have made 
all payments as scheduled 
3 5 1 , 9 4 3 . 2 0 
PAYMENTS: Your payment schedule wi l l be: 
Number of Amount of When Payments 
Payments Payments are Due 
Numoer of 
Payments 
Amount of 
Payments 
When Payments 
are Due 
Number of Amount of When Payments 
Payments Payments are Due 
Monthly 
Beginning 
(Monthly 
beginning 
Monthly 
Beginning 
360 9 7 7 . 6 2 2 / 0 1 / 1 9 8 7 
This obligation 1 5 does Q does not have a demand feature. 
INSURANCE: 
Credit Life Insurance and Credit Disability Insurance are not required to obtain credit. 
You may obtain Property Insurance from anyone you want that is acceptable to credit. 
If you desire Homeowner's Insurance from Commonwealth Mortgage Compdny of America. L.P your premium will be S 
SECURITY: 
You are giving a security interest in the property located at 
10307 SOUTH EDGECLIFF DRIVE, SANDY, UT 84092 
R U N G FEES: 
5."0 % of the 
LATE CHARGE. 
If payment is not received within F I F T E E N days of its due date, you will be charged . 
past due installment or S 4 8 . 8 8 , whichever sum is greater. 
PREPAYMENT: 
If you pay off early, you Q may GPWill not have to pay a penalty. 
D may GPWill not be entitled to a refund of part of the finance charge. 
ASSUMPTION: 
Someone buying your house G may C m a y , subject to conditions, 5 ^ may not assume tne remainder of your loan on the 
original terms. 
REQUIRED OEPOSIT: 
The annual percentage rate does not take into account your required deposit. 
See your contract documents ror any additional information about nonpayment, default, and required repayment in ful l before 
the scheduled date, and prepayment refunds and penalties. 
I desire an itemization of amount financed: Yes D No D 
DANA R. CANNON BRYANE W. CANNON 
Al l dates and numer ica l d isc losures except the late payment d isc losures are es t imates . 
Commitment Face Page 
COMMITMENT FOR TITLE INSURANCE 
ISSUED BY 
Surety Tifle Agency 
1445 EAST 2100 SOUTH • SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84105 
(801)486-5300 
C(>M)NWEALTH WESTERN M3RTGAGE RE: Cannon 
4001 South 700 East F i l e No. 17023W 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Acct/425 
Attention: Brad 
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, herein called the Company, for valuable consideratior 
hereby commits to issue its policy or policies of title insurance, as identified in Schedule A, in favor of the propose 
Insured named in Schedule A, as owner or mortgagee of the estate or interest covered hereby in the land described o 
referred to in Schedule A, upon payment of the premiums and charges therefor; all subject to the provisions of Schedule 
A and B and to the Conditions and Stipulations hereof. 
This Commitment shall be effective only when the identity of the proposed Insured and the amount of the police 
or policies committed for have been inserted in Schedule A hereof by the Company, either at the time of the issuano 
of this Commitment or by subsequent indorsement. 
This Commitment is preliminary to the issuance of such policy or policies of title insurance and alt liability and obli 
gations hereunder shall cease and terminate six (6) months after the effective date hereof or when the policy or policies 
committed for shall issue, whichever first occurs, provided that the failure to issue such policy or policies is not the fauli 
of the Company. This Commitment shall not be valid or binding until countersigned by an authorized officer or agent 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company has caused this Commitment to be signed and sealed, to become valid wher 
countersigned by an authorized officer or agent of the Company, all in accordance with its By-Laws. This Commitment 
is effective as of the date shown in Schedule A as "Effective Date." 
\[\.i • , First American Title Insurance Company 
^>Jf^C PRESIDENT 
ATTEST W JUU£\-*lLr. S £ZC^sL~~ d SECRETARY 
COUNTERSIGNED
 M 
GOO< 
Form 1756-A 
Commitment, Schedule A 
SCHEDULE A 
1. Effective Date: April 22, 1987 
a t 8:00 a.m. 
Commitment No: 
Policy or Policies to be issued: 
(a) O ALTA Owner's Policy 
Proposed Insured: 
(b) E3 ALTA Loan Policy 
Proposed Insured: CX>MDNWEALTH WESTERN MORTGAGE] 
17023W 
Amount 
116,550.00 
TBD 
(c) |EJ INDORSEMENTS 1 0 0 & 1 1 6 30 .00 
The estate or interest in the land described or referred to in this commitment and covered herein is fee simple and 
title thereto is at the effective date hereof vested in: 
BRYAN W. CANNON and DANA R. CANNON, husband and wife as joint tenants 
with full rights of survivorship and not as tenants in common 
The land referred to in this commitment is 
All of Lot #22, WHITE CITY #50 SUBDIVISION, as recorded in the official 
plat thereof in the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office. 
SITUATE IN SALT LAKE COUNTY 
ADDRESS: 10307 South Edgecliff Drive 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
^nriril1^ 
Fcum 17bb - H2 (Revved July, 1072) 
Commitment, Schedule 8-2 
SCHEDULE B - Section 2 No. 17Q23W 
Exceptions 
The policy or policies 10 be issued will contain exceptions to the following unless the same are disposed of to the 
satisfaction of the Company. 
1. Taxes or assessments which are not shown as existing liens by the records of any taxing authority that levies 
taxes or assessments on real property or by the public records. 
2. Any facts, rights, interests, or claims which are not shown by the public records but which could be ascertained 
by an inspection of said land or by making inquiry of persons in possession thereof. 
3. Easements, claims of easement or encumbrances which are not shown by the public records. 
4. Discrepancies, conflicts in boundary lines, shortage in area, encroachments, or any other facts which a correct 
survey would disclose, and which are not shown by public records. 
5. Unpatented mining claims; reservations or exceptions in patents or in Acts authorizing the issuance thereof; 
water rights, claims or title to water. 
6. Any lien, or right to a lien, for services, labor or material theretofore or hereafter furnished, imposed by law 
and not shown by the public records. 
7. Defects, liens, encumbrances, adverse claims or other matters, if any, created, first appearing in the public rec-
ords or attaching subsequent to the effective date hereof but prior to the date the proposed insured acquires 
of record for value the estate or interest or mortgage thereon covered by this commitment. 
8« Taxes for the year 1987 accruing as a lien, not yet due. 
Taxes for the year 1986 have been paid in the amount of $1,471.78. 
Sidwell Number: 28-16-208-016. 
9. Subject property is located within the boundaries of Sandy Suburban 
Inprovement District and is subject to any assessment and/or service charges 
U\ lln/^VjA^^^^ therein* For current information call 561-7662. ~ s cSffis*^ 'p1*' 
10. Subject property is located within the boundaries of Sandy City and is 
subject to any assessment and/or service charges levied therein. For current 
information call 566-1561. 
11. Subject to a public utility easement on the Westerly 7 feet and a public 
utility drainage over the Easterly 10 feet of subject property as recorded in 
Book 84-5, Page 73. 
12. TRUST DEED 
Amount: $112,500.00 
Beneficiary: City Federal Savings & Loan Association 
Trustee: Surety Title Agency 
Trustor: Bryan W. Cannon and Dana R. Cannon 
Dated: December 30, 1985 
Recorded: December 31, 1985 
Book/Page: 5723/19 
Entry No.: 4183141 
Exceptions numbered are hereby omitted. 
/ ^ ^ — . L . 1 ~ J \ ono 
File No. 17023W 
SCHEDULE B 2 (continued) 
NOTE: A search of the Federal and State judgment' records revealed no unpaid 
judgments, tax liens or bankruptcies of record against the vested 
owners for the past eight years. 
nnnfl!l9 
Oe?<3// ( 
10380 $0. 
26H.0 
t^rxf 
FILMED 
FILED IN CLEWS OFFICE 
SAL? LAKE CCUNH. UTAH 
J a 6 2 27 PM '87 
Robert M. Anderson, #0108 
Bruce Wycoff, #4448 
HANSEN & ANDERSON 
50 West Broadway, Suite 600 orp 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 532-7520 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
BRYAN W. CANNON and 
DANA R. CANNON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
COMMONWEALTH WESTERN 
MORTGAGE CORPORATION, an 
Oregon corporation, now known 
as COMMONWEALTH MORTGAGE 
CORPORATION OF AMERICA, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
ROBERT BRADLEY MEADOWS 
Civil No. 087^3337 
Judge Pat Brian 
* * * * * * * * 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss: 
Utah, have personal 
County of Salt Lake ) 
Robert Bradley Meadows, being first duly sworn, finder oath deposes and 
states as follows: 
1. I am a resident of Salt Lake County,] 
knowledge of all matters stated herein, and if called to tesjtify, I would and could 
confidently testify thereto. 
2. I am the Brad Meadows referred to in the J^ ine 22, 1987 Affidavit 
of Bryan W. Cannon. 
3. Not later than three days following my receipt of plaintiffs* loan 
application, I caused to be prepared and mailed to plaintiffs the Federal Truth in 
Lending Loan Disclosure Statement (the "Disclosure Statement") attached to 
Bryan CannonTs Affidavit as Exhibit "1". 
4. The Disclosure Statement is required by federal law; its 
preparation and issuance in no way obligated defendant to offer the loan described 
in the Disclosure Statement, In my experience, approximately thirty percent of 
loan applications and disclosure statements never lead to a commitment to issue a 
loan. 
5. Defendant's standard procedure, followed in the case of plaintiff's 
application, was to obtain title and credit reports before any decision was made to 
approve or reject a refinance loan application such as plaintiffs. 
6* Defendant never committed to make a loan to plaintiffs on the 
terms set forth in their Complaint, or on any other terms. 
7. Contrary to Bryan Cannon's belief expressed in H 10 of his 
Affidavit, no documents authored or subscribed by defendant, its agents or 
employees exist, or have ever existed, in the files and records of defendant 
referring or relating in any way to defendant's alleged offer to loan money to 
plaintiffs; this is so because defendant never approved a loan to plaintiffs and 
never authorized or approved a loan commitment to plaintiffs. 
8. I know the statements contained in paragraph 7 of this Affidavit 
are true because any such documents would have to be reviewed by me, and would 
have to be contained in plaintiff's application file. I neither wrote nor reviewed 
such documents, and plaintiff's application file does not contain, and has never 
contained, such documents. 
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DATED June #&
 % 1987. 
Robert BrSdley Meadows 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 
by Robert Bradley Meadows. 
My Commission Expires: Notary Publ 
Residing at:_ 
WjU< day of June, 1987, 
fit 1AM m-<miu^p 
ary Publfc „ . ~ L> 
'fktqriJt Mr/, mA 
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